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Abstract
The issue of ‘Ali Baba’ businesses, specifically in the retail sector, has been long debated in Brunei 
Darussalam, socially and recently in the legislature. The definition of ‘Ali Baba’ business in Brunei 
Darussalam refers to expatriates use of citizens’ licence to conduct a business in the country. 
Although such practices are well-known and widely written in Malaysia and to a lesser extent in 
Indonesia, there is scarce academic literature of the phenomenon in Brunei Darussalam. This paper 
is a preliminary attempt to fill in the literature gap and to find out the extent and characteristics 
of ‘Ali Baba’ businesses in Brunei Darussalam, specifically in the retail sector. Semi-structured 
interviews were used to obtain empirical data as well as from personal on-site observations in a 
small Mukim or sub-district in Brunei Darussalam. The preliminary findings of the research were 
profound. This paper argues that the term ‘Ali Baba’ businesses is no longer suitable to refer the 
retail sector in Brunei Darussalam, rather, it should be known as ‘Ali Chandran’ businesses, as 
the expatriate partner is now commonly from the Asian sub-continent. 
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Introduction
Brunei Darussalam (henceforth, Brunei) 
is a petroleum rich country, discovered since 
1929 and has made Brunei one of the world’s 
richest countries. However, petroleum is a 
finite, depletable resource. As Brunei became 
a rentier economy, characterised by rents 
dominating the economy (Beblawi & Luciani, 
1987); entrepreneurship among the local 
citizens did not did not flourish as the locals 
preferred to seek permanent employment 
in the public sector. Brunei also suffers from 
‘Dutch Disease’ a term coined by the Economist 
magazine in 1977 (The Economist, 2014) to 
describe petroleum rich states’ inability to 
diversify their economies from over relying 
on petroleum resources. To date, over 89% of 
Brunei’s export derives from the petroleum 
sector (Jabatan Perancang Kemajuan Ekonomi, 
JPKE, 2018a).
The private sector is weak and is 
dependent on government projects as suppliers 
and contractors for the Brunei government 
(Hayat, 2017). It is estimated that about 90% of 
the private businesses in the country are made 
up of Micro Small and Medium Enterprises 
(MSMEs), defined as businesses which employ 
less than 100 employees (ibid). Due to its image 
as a rich and peaceful country, Brunei continues 
to attract migrant entrepreneurs to set up 
businesses in the country. The government 
policy after independence from Britain in 
1984 highlighted the need to develop ‘Rakyat 
Melayu’ (Malay citizens) as leaders of industry 
and commerce as stated in its fifth National 
Development Plan, NDP (1986-1990), however, 
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the policy failed as only a ‘few’ Malays became 
leaders of industry and commerce (9th NDP, 
2007-2012). The ninth NDP again highlighted 
the need to have a local business development 
strategy as part of Wawasan 2035 (Vision 2035) 
to ‘enhance opportunities’ for local small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) as well as 
‘enable Brunei Malays to achieve leadership 
in business and industry’ (JPKE, 2007, p. 13). 
Nevertheless, by the 10th NDP (2012-2017), the 
focus on promoting the Malays as business 
leaders in the country were removed to 
encompass all Bruneian citizens regardless of 
their racial background (JPKE, 2012).
Brunei’s economy suffered recession 
in the following years, due to the drop in 
global petroleum prices. It was only in 2017 
that Brunei recorded a positive growth rate of 
1.3% (Wong, 2018) and 0.1% in 2018 (Bandial, 
Hamit, & Wasil, 2019). It became more urgent 
for the government to encourage the citizens 
to look for employment in the private sector 
and become business owners due to increasing 
unemployment rate in the country and one 
of the sectors that came under scrutiny is the 
issue of expatriate ownership, the ‘Ali Baba’ 
businesses in the country. ‘Ali Baba’ businesses 
are a common practice in Brunei, and media 
reports highlighting it has become more 
obvious in recent times, especially when it was 
brought up in the legislature several times.  The 
newly elected president of the Brunei Malay 
Chamber of Commerce, who is also a member 
of the Legislative Council noted that,
”… We can learn from mistakes of the 
‘Ali Baba’ practice. We want locals to 
take over businesses monopolised 
by foreigners. If Malay businesses 
are united, the government will 
assist” (Othman, 2018a).
Although ‘Ali Baba’ businesses are 
widespread in Brunei, there is scant academic 
literature on it. There were calls for research 
to be done at the national level as highlighted 
in the Legislative Council in 2016, 2018, 
2019 (Hansard, March 9th 2016; Hayat 2018; 
Othman 2019), however to date, there is 
no governmental report or research out on 
matter.  The lack of literature on this issue 
provides the impetus for this research, which 
aims to find out the extent of the ‘Ali Baba’ 
businesses in Brunei, specifically in the retail 
sector; to find out how different are their 
characteristics when compared to those in 
Malaysia and Indonesia, as the term has 
origins from the Malay Archipelago; to find 
out if it is still ‘Ali Babas’ who are running the 
business or if the term is no longer suitable 
to the current context. 
Literature Review
Origins of the Term
The literature on ‘Ali Baba’ businesses is 
more pronounced in Malaysia than in Brunei 
although the term originated from Indonesia 
(Wang, 1976, in Siddique & Suryadinata, 1982). 
According to Lindblad (2002), ‘Ali’ stands for 
the Indonesian partner who sold his licence to 
‘Baba,’ an ethnic Chinese buyer.2 Why the name 
Ali? According to Lindblad (2002), rampant 
corruption happened during the first cabinet of 
Ali Sastromidjojo, the eight Prime Minister of 
Indonesia, who accelerated the Benteng Policy; 
hence, the term ‘Ali Baba’ became popular 
(Lindblad, 2008).  The word Baba, refers to the 
ethnic Chinese who were born in Indonesia, 
whose ancestors migrated to Indonesia from 
China decades or centuries ago. While ventures 
with ethnic Chinese created the ‘Ali Baba,’ 
there is no new term to describe indigenous 
ventures with non-indigenous, such as the 
Dutch in Indonesia, although Van De Kerkhof 
(2005) noted that ‘Ali Baba’ does not refer only 
to the Chinese, but also others including the 
‘Westerners’. The later part of this review will 
show that in Brunei, the term has changed and 
2 Lindblad (2002) contends that it is actually Babah, 
the Chinese Wa Wa Sze, used in derogative manner 
by Chinese born in China against Chinese born in 
Indonesia.
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adapted to connote the ethnic origins of the 
businessmens in such partnership. 
Indonesia
Originally, the Benteng Policy, (Indonesian 
word for ‘Fortress’ or ‘protected’ (Glassburner, 
1962),3 introduced by the sixth Prime Minister 
of Indonesia, Sukiman Wirjosandjojo in 1950, 
aimed to help  ‘economically weak groups’ 
(the indigenous people) with government’s 
protection and preferential treatment in the 
lucrative import licences controlled by the 
Dutch and ethnic Chinese (Thuy, 2015). The 
policy saw the number of Benteng importers 
rose from 250 in 1950 to 5,000 in 1954 (ibid.). 
However, instead of creating successful 
Indonesian entrepreneurs, 80 per cent of all 
licences were sold to non-indigenous traders 
(Thuy, 2015). Glassburner (1962) contends 
that the Benteng policy was abused to give 
financial support for the governing political 
party. Utrecht (1984) revealed this to be in 
region of 40 to 60 per cent of the commission 
between the party, government official and 
the licence holder. The selling of the licence 
resulted in another popular term created in 
public discourse, that of ‘briefcase importers’ 
(Lindblad, 2008) or ‘briefcase firms’ (Thuy, 
2015). It refers to indigenous citizens’ readiness 
to produce their licences, pretending that they 
owned the business, when in fact they were 
controlled and financed by others (Lindblad, 
2008).  Due to the abuses of the system, the 
ninth Indonesian Prime Minister Burhanuddin 
Harahap abolished the Benteng policy in 1955, 
and replaced it with a policy which prioritised 
all Indonesian citizens regardless of their ethnic 
origin (Glassburnder, 1962; Thuy, 2015). 
Overall, Wie (2009, p. 33) noted that the 
Benteng programme failed to ‘foster a strong, 
self-reliant indigenous merchant class” but 
“furthered a group of licenced brokers and 
political fixers, unproductive ‘rent-seekers’ 
3  Glassburner (1962) refers the term as fortified
or ‘rent-harvesters.’” Similarly, Lindblad 
(2008, p. 131) noted that the Benteng policy 
is a “complete failure” and did not achieve 
its main objectives; instead it resulted in 
corruption, “a blatant rent-seeking operation.” 
Indonesian former Minister of Finance, Sumitro 
Djojohadikusumo, however, seemed to justify 
the policy by asserting that “if you give assistance 
to ten people, seven might turn out to be parasites 
but you might still get three entrepreneurs” 
(Lindblad, 2008, p. 135).
Although the ‘Ali Baba’ system ended, 
a new system, the Cukong, emerged. Cukong 
mean ‘master’ in the Chinese Hokkien dialect, 
and it refers to Chinese businessman in alliance 
with Indonesian power holders, specifically, 
those in the military (Suryadinata, 1976). 
Utrecht (1984) labelled this reformed system as 
Ali (Suharto)-Cukong economy as the Cukong 
system emerged strongly during President 
Suharto’s 31 years rule (1967-1998). 
Malaysia
In Malaysia, the literature on Ali Baba 
partnership is more common, openly discussed 
and politically justified. Ali is always commonly 
referred to as the indigenous people of the 
country, and Ali is argued to be a common 
Malay name (Chin & Teh, 2015). ‘Baba,’ on 
the other hand refers to the Straits-born4 
Chinese or ‘Peranakan,’ descendants of Fujian 
Chinese from China, majority of them being 
Chinese Hokkien (Tan, 2004). Centuries of 
intermarriage and interaction with local Malay 
(when religious differences did not matter 
then) coupled with their adaptability created 
a Peranakan (means ‘locally born person’ 
or ‘descendants’) society. Since the British 
colonisers accorded the Straits-born Chinese 
with prestige and influence, the Straits-born 
Chinese liked to be known as Baba. From then 
on, the term Baba, Straits Chinese and Straits-
4 Reference to Straits of Malacca, where Chinese traders 
had travelled for centuries 
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born Chinese were used synonymously (Png, 
1969).
Ali is always referred to as a ‘silent 
partner’ (Crouch, 2001; Chin and Teh, 2015), 
and a “sleeping partner,” who receives financial 
rewards but gains little in form of practical 
business experience (Siddique & Suryadinata, 
1982). Noor and Leong (2013) contended 
that the partnership with selected few well-
connected Malays, created the new elites, 
resulted in the political economy of “elite 
bargaining” in Malaysia. Heng (1997) defined 
such arrangement as “rentier capitalist”, 
where accesses to high-ranking political and 
bureaucratic power holders are important 
in the ‘Ali Baba’ business arrangement. Such 
arrangement was abused so much that Crouch 
(2001, p. 234) labelled it as a “gigantic patronage 
scheme.” This patronage scheme was legalised 
in the form of the affirmative action policy of 
the New Economic Policy5 in 1969, which gave 
preferential treatment to the Malays, who were 
deemed economically weak as they owned just 
1.5 per cent of their country’s corporate wealth; 
hence, needed the government’s intervention 
and support. The policy was supposed to 
end after 20 years, but it has continued to this 
day, citing the 30 per cent of Malay corporate 
ownership of business has not been met. 
Malaysia’s seventh Prime Minister and 
the world’s oldest, Mahathir Mohammad, 
said that the NEP did not fail as the positions 
of the Malays were much better than before. 
However, the Malays did not respond correctly 
to the opportunities given to them, as they 
would sell off their government contracts. The 
Malays, according to Mahathir,
“… Are not really oriented towards 
doing businesses at the moment. 
They don’t handle money well. You 
give them a job where they are in 
5 The New Economic Policy (1969-1990), continued under 
the National Development Policy (1991-2000), then 
National Vision Policy (2001-2010); New Economic 
Model (2010-2020) and now National Transformation 
Policy (TN2050). 
charge of funds, for example, they 
don’t manage it well. Sometimes, 
they even take the money for 
themselves. This is the reality of the 
situation.”(Dzulkifly, 2018)
Shome and Hamidon (2009) believed 
that ‘Ali Baba’ practices are illegal, and an 
‘advantage’ to non-Malay business people as it 
contributes to their greater resilience to survive, 
to be innovative and creative use of their 
capital and resources. Indeed, the affirmative 
action policy failed to make the Malays 
more entrepreneurial as it contradicted the 
principles of entrepreneurship. Crouch (2001) 
noted that while the affirmative action policy 
did not exclude the Chinese from business 
opportunities; it merely made business more 
expensive for them to conduct. It helped 
that Malaysia was a growing economy, and 
its economic growth has ensured that more 
opportunities are available. Regardless of the 
restriction, Chinese ownership of businesses 
continued, and Malaysia in general, has seen 
an improvement in its living standards, as 
Malaysia’s income inequality is ASEAN’s 
second lowest after Thailand (Chong, 2018; 
Lim, 2018).
Brunei
‘Ali Baba’ phenomenon also exists in 
Brunei, and it is an ‘open story’ (Thien, 
2012).  The term ‘Ali Baba’ is believed to be a 
direct importation from Malaysian media as 
Brunei has a close relationship with Malaysia. 
Malaysian news and entertainment are not only 
received freely in Brunei, its newspapers and 
radio stations are popular among Bruneians 
as well. 
After independence from Britain in 1984, 
Brunei’s fifth NDP aimed to make the Malays the 
leaders of industry and commerce. Policies were 
made whereby Malays registered businesses 
were given preferential treatment when 
dealing with government and government-
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linked companies (GLCs) (Heeks, 1998). Heeks 
(1998) argued that going into business was not 
an economic necessity for retired Bruneian 
Malays as they were financially well-off due 
to their pension. Furthermore, he argued that 
the ‘unemployed are well provided for through the 
incomes of other family members’ (Heeks, 1998, p. 
24).  Even when there were several thousand 
registered businesses in the country, 
“… in reality, however, this is mainly 
‘window dressing’. Ownership rules 
are subverted in two ways. Firstly, 
by the creation of subsidiaries with 
much greater non-Malay (typically 
Chinese) equity, into which funds 
are diverted. Secondly, by the 
fact that the Malay partners are 
usually sleeping partners who 
are not involved with the running 
of the enterprise. Known locally 
as ‘Ali Babas’, these partners will 
give their name to the firm in 
exchange for a percentage of profit, 
a percentage of turnover, or a direct 
commission payment based on 
winning a contract through their 
local connections. Those with good 
connections are often highly prized 
and are requested to act as partners 
in many different firms. As well as 
providing the contacts that lead 
to contracts, the Malay partners 
can also help keep government 
inspectors at bay. Many of these 
supposed entrepreneurs often risk 
little in salary and privilege terms. 
Some retain their public sector or 
large company jobs and create the 
business in, for example, their wife’s 
name” (Heeks, 1998, p. 25). 
Twenty years after Heek’s observation, 
some things have changed while others 
have not. The economy is still reliant on 
petroleum resources, but the unemployed are 
no necessarily provided for by their family 
members. Unemployment is a national issue 
as more youth who graduated from secondary 
schools and universities are finding it hard to 
find jobs (Wasil, 2018). Brunei’s unemployment 
rate rose to 9.3 per cent in 2017, and the average 
salary has dropped to B$1,478, down from 
B$1,874 in 2014 (JPKE, 2018b). Researchers 
from the Centre for Strategic and Policy Studies 
(CSPS) believed that youth unemployment rate 
is around 30% in 2017 (CSPS, 2018; Kon, 2018). 
It is not as if Brunei does not have enough jobs, 
as Brunei still has over 64,8000 ‘temporary 
residents’ (JPKE, 2018a) in the country,6 but 
these are jobs which Bruneians are not keen 
to have. 
The issue of ‘Ali Baba’ business in Brunei, 
in the late 2000s were mostly focused on locals 
lending their licences to Indonesians in the 
markets (pasar), and by 2010s, the focus was 
on retail business mushrooming along the 
roads in Brunei.  The Former Minister of Home 
Affairs noted that a 12km stretch between Jalan 
Residency to Kota Batu and Sungai Buluh, 
contained “hundreds of convenience stores, 
supermarket and department stores as well as 
various facilities like tailors and laundry services” 
operating as ‘Ali Baba’ businesses (May and 
Roslan, 2012). However, the reference to these 
small businesses being owned by ‘Ali Baba’ 
was challenged by a former senior government 
officer, who wrote in the national newspaper, 
that the country no longer faces an ‘Ali Baba’ 
business phenomenon, rather, it is now ‘Ali 
Chandran’ businesses. Businesses in Brunei 
he said,
“… has become “ABC” phenomenon: 
Ali Baba Chandran. In algebraic 
notation: ABC that is Chandran is 
now more penetratingly powerful 
and successful! Making Ali becoming 
more dependent on Chandran! … 
Ali is the tortoise, Chandran is the 
galloping horse.” (Hj. Karim, 2011). 
6 In 2010 alone, there were 112,500 foreign works in the 
country, in 2011 it increased to 120,000 (May & Roslan, 
2012). 
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Hj Karim (2011) did not explain why 
he used the name Chandran, but to Bruneian 
readers of his article, his reference was 
understood to refer to the ethnic Indians in 
Brunei. The Indians have migrated to Brunei 
since Britain became Brunei’s protector in 1906 
and by the 1990s they started to dominate the 
small retail market, small restaurants as well as 
tailoring shops (Mani, 2008; Malai Yusop, 2018). 
Why is it easy for such businesses to flourish 
in Brunei? According to officials, locals were 
willing to sell their licence in lump sum or on 
a monthly basis, giving the wrong perception 
that government department gave licences to 
foreigners. It was said that the Labour Act does 
not mention or relate anything to the ‘Ali Baba’ 
business; thus, making easier for migrants to 
work in the retail sector and it was harder for 
the agency responsible to monitor businesses 
that were set up in the country (Anwar and 
Zaini, 2007). Norjidi and Eng (2009) interviews 
in 2009 showed that most ‘Ali Chandran’ 
businesses seemed to be ‘small businesses’, 
and locals commonly rented their licences 
to them. A former minister also noted that 
foreign nationals were needed in the country to 
‘activate’ the business licences in Brunei (Masli, 
2012). Since locals are more interested to work 
with the public sector rather than the private 
sector, the issue of ‘Ali Baba’ or in this case, 
‘Ali Chandran’ businesses was not high on the 
national agenda as they are seen as functional 
to society, providing a place for residents or 
villages to buy daily necessities near to their 
homes. Furthermore, the benefits of receiving 
the ‘rents’ from the expatriates as well as no 
outright problems or issues that that have 
been reported due such partnership, ensures 
continued support for the policy.
Jones (2016) believes that many of 
the ‘sleeping partners’ in the business are 
government officials and the practice is not 
only unethical but also corrupt as the partner 
did nothing but received rents and earned a 
reward out of it. Brunei public servants with 
written permission from the Prime Minister’s 
Office (PMO)7 are allowed to be involved in 
business as long as it does not interfere with 
their office responsibilities. Such rule however 
is difficult to monitor and some entrepreneurial 
public servants still do small side business such 
as food business, without PMO’s approval. In 
the 2019 Legislative Council meeting, members 
have called for the establishment of ‘Ali-Ali’ 
businesses (owned and run by ‘local’ Bruneians) 
to encourage more local entrepreneurship in 
the country (Othman, 2019).
Similarities and Differences
From the above literature, it is clear 
that the licensing system introduced by the 
government which gave preferential treatment 
to indigenous citizens resulted in the rise 
of ‘Ali Baba’ system. The Ali is always the 
indigenous citizens while the Baba is always an 
ethnic Chinese, specifically the ethnic Chinese 
whose ancestors have settled in the country 
for a generation or more. The government has 
good intention to ensure indigenous citizens 
benefits from the system by encouraging them 
to be more entrepreneurial, however, in most 
cases, the opposite happens, it is far easier for 
indigenous citizens to rent or sell the business 
licence for a fee and monthly fee. Ali is always 
seen as ‘sleeping’ or a ‘silent’ partner while his 
non-indigenous partner is the actual owner, 
who runs and manages the business. 
While the Indonesians continued with 
its Cukong system and Malaysia with its ‘Ali 
Baba’ system, Brunei’s system has evolved into 
that of ‘Ali Chandran’ business, specifically 
in the retail sector as they are more obvious 
around the residential roads in Brunei.  Ethnic 
Chinese who are known to be Brunei’s earliest 
7 The rule is in the General Orders (G.O.) part of Public 
Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations, 1962, 
Chapter 83 in the Laws of Brunei Darussalam. Reference 
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retailers are shunning the retail business for 
white collar professional and skill jobs (Pang, 
2015), hence the vacuum left by the Chinese 
created opportunities for other entrepreneurial 
migrants to come and take the spot as local 
indigenous citizens are more interested to 
work in the public sector. The composition of 
Chinese population in Brunei has also declined 
throughout the decade, constituting 26% of 
Brunei’s total population in 1960 to 10.3% 
based on the 2011 population census (Pang, 
2015), therefore it is perhaps unsurprising that 
the Chinese business ownership in Brunei has 
become less obvious. 
While the Indonesian ‘Cukong’ and 
Malaysian ‘Ali Baba’ system focused on 
multimillion dollar businesses which are 
run by ethnic Chinese, in Brunei, although 
such observations can be made in the small 
construction and petroleum industries (Thein, 
2011; No, 2012) the reference to ‘Ali Baba’ 
businesses in Brunei in recent years are mostly 
focused on those in small businesses in the 
retail sector. The retail sector is not seen as a 
sector that earn high profit, although the 2015 
Economic Census of Enterprise estimated 
that the retail and wholesale trade is the third 
biggest earner in the country, recording a 
revenue of B$5.2 billion (JPKE, 2016). The 
official data however, combines both retail and 
wholesale activities as one and the interviewees 
from this research claims that wholesalers 
actually earns more than them. Overall, 
Bruneian businesses are smaller in size and 
profit compared to Malaysia and Indonesia 
due it her small population and market size.
Although Brunei has followed Indonesia’s 
path of encouraging all citizens regardless of 
their racial background to support local business 
as identified in the 10th NDP, nevertheless 
there are still preferential treatments given to 
indigenous citizens, specifically in government 
and GLCs contracts, just like in Malaysia. 
However, how successful these local businesses 
are after given preferential treatments, are also 
under researched. 
Another common characteristics of 
‘Ali Baba’ system is, since ethnic Chinese has 
become citizens of the country, they do not need 
to have an indigenous partner to ‘activate’ their 
business license. They only need an indigenous 
partner if they bid for government contracts as 
per government requirement. In Brunei, since 
every new small retail shops that opened at the 
Kampong (village) roads were often opened 
by people from the sub-continent; therefore 
the ‘Ali Chandran’ business partnership is 
more obvious. As citizenship laws have been 
tightened, it has become difficult for new 
migrants to get Brunei citizenship; hence they 
have to depend on a local partner or marry a 
local Bruneian to start their business in Brunei. 
Although the government has initiated several 
restrictions, such as a freeze on employment 
quotas (Kon, 2019), which is one of the two 
ways that foreign nationals could come into 
the country and work, it remained to be seen 
if this could reduce the dominance of ‘Ali 
Chandran’ businesses in Brunei not only in the 
retail, restaurants, tailoring, textiles but also in 
hardware businesses. 
Research Agenda
Due to the prevalence of the ‘Ali-
Chandran’ rather than ‘Ali Baba’ business in 
Brunei, as highlighted in the media and in 
the legislature, this research aimed to find the 
characteristics of the ‘Ali Chandran’ businesses 
in Brunei, specifically those in the retail sector. 
The research aim to find out how and why 
did the ethnic Indians choose Brunei to do 
business and what are the challenges they face 
in their business in recent times and how are 
they affected by Bruneians who are reportedly 
buying their groceries across boarder in 
the neighbouring town of Miri, Sarawak. 
Favourable exchange rate between Brunei and 
Malaysia cause Bruneians to buy their groceries 
in neighbouring town of Miri, Sarawak. In 2017, 
Bruneians spent an estimated B$1.25 billion 
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in Malaysia, which averages about B$2,962 
per person in Brunei (Bandial, 2018a). Data 
from Sarawak government shows that in 2017, 
there are about 1.7million visits by Bruneians8 
and despite the drop in the number of visits 
by Bruneians in 2018 to 1.3 million (Sarawak 
Government, 2018), Bruneians remains Sarawak 
largest visitors. It is estimated that Bruneians 
spent between B$100 to B$500 for each trip they 
went to Miri and the popular times to go are 
during weekends (Hazair, 2018). It is important 
that such question is asked, because if retail 
businesses in Brunei are affected by the outflow 
of people shopping across the national boarder, 
and yet the retail businesses still prevail, what 
then are the factors that allow the small retail 
stores to survive in Brunei? 
Methods
This research used qualitative research 
method, specifically a case study approach 
using semi-structured interviews to gather 
data. A case study approach is appropriate for 
this research as it is studying a contemporary 
event within its context (Yin, 2018). Also, given 
that the study focused on a group of retailers, 
semi-structured interviews approach was 
used as it focused on specific questions to be 
investigated. Personal observation was also 
used to observe the activities of the retail stores 
and the goods sold. 
Mukim Serasa,9 which has an area of 34.7 
square kilometres was chosen as the location for 
the research as the author originated from the 
Mukim and knew about the history of the area. 
The town, Muara,10 used to be made up ethnic 
8 Bruneians are Sarawak’s biggest visitor for many years, 
due to the country’s proximity to each other, historic 
and family links with people across the border as well 
as favourable exchange rate of the Brunei dollar against 
the Malaysian ringgit 
9 Sub-district. A collection of few villages made up a sub-
district or Mukim
10 Mukim Serasa has an old coal mine, which the Charles 
Brooke, 2nd Rajah of Sarawak named Brooketon when 
he purchased it from William Cowie in 1888 for $25,000. 
Cowie was given the lease to mine coals in Brunei by the 
Chinese-owned retail stores (Lim, 1986) but it 
is now dominated by retailers from the sub-
continent. Higher education and changes in the 
economy have allowed the next generation of 
ethnic Chinese families to shun retail businesses 
as retail businesses meant long working hours 
and with increasing competition, lower profit 
margin, compared to being employed in 
professional jobs in the government or  in 
the private sector. The vacuum resulted in a 
new generation of migrants coming in and 
dominating the retail market in Mukim Serasa 
and in Muara Town. The Chinese who own 
commercial buildings in Muara Town prefer to 
rent out their shops rather than to be involved 
in businesses. As of December 2018, there are 
eight retail stores selling daily goods in Muara 
Town (Pekan Muara), four in Muara ‘Centre’, 
seven along Serasa Road, and seven along Jalan 
Muara, before the boundary of Mukim Serasa 
in Kampong Salar. There are 26 retail shops 
in Mukim Serasa excluding the hardware, 
restaurants, laundry, tailor and barber shops, 
servicing an estimated 16,000 people11 in the 
Mukim Serasa12 (See Map 1 Below). 
Sultan of Brunei in 1882. Within 33 years of its operation, 
the Brooketon colliery incurred $1.5million loss and its 
capital expenditure was never recovered.  In 1915, coal 
export earnings contributed to 28 percent of export 
earnings of Brunei as part of the export royalty it receives 
from Sarawak government (Cleary, 1996). Sarawak’s 3rd 
Rajah Charles Vyner Brooke decided to close the mines 
in 1924 and returned it to Brunei when Sultan Ahmad 
Tajuddin, the 27th Sultan of Brunei was enthroned. The 
deed was signed in March 1932 (see Horton, 1986). 
11 JPKE (2018), Personal Correspondence
12 In the 1981 and 1991 population census summary tables, 
Mukim Serasa included Kampong Kapok, Serasa, 
Sabun, Masjid Lama, Pekan Muara, Pelompong and 
Perpindahan Serasa. Based on 2001 census, Kampong 
Masjib Lama was merged into Pekan Muara. Based 
on 2011 census, Kampong Pelompong was merged 
into Pekan Muara, while Perpindahan Serasa was 
merged into Kampong Serasa. Based on personal 
correspondence with JPKE, the 2011 data for Mukim 
Serasa included Kampong Pulau Baru-Baru, an island 
which is geographically located near to Mukim Mentiri 
and Mukim Kota Batu, rathr than Mukim Serasa but 
whose population census was included in the Mukim 
Serasa population. JPKE explained that they followed 
the information provided by Survey Department, 
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Map 1.
Map of Mukim Serasa, Brunei-Muara 
District
Source: Survey Department ,  Ministry  o f 
Development (2006)
Based on available population census 
reports, it shows that Mukim Serasa is 
predominantly a Malay settlement and was 
a finishing village (Lim, 1986; JPKE, 2019) 
(See Table 1 below). In 1971, there were 3,714 
residents in Mukim Serasa and this gradually 
increased to 13,315 people by 2001. Between 
1971 to 2001, there were many development 
and changes in Mukim Serasa, for example, 
residents in Masjid Lama water village were 
moved to Serasa Resettlement Village to make 
way for the Muara port extension, building 
and extension of Brunei Royal Navy base and 
Muara police and marine headquarters. There 
was also a sharp increase in the number of 
people in the Mukim from 1991 to 2001, which 
saw the population increased by 70 per cent, 
from 7,820 to 13,315; the highest increase was 
due to the ‘Others.’  This can be attributed to the 
development of garment and textile industry 
in the Serasa industrial area. Brunei enjoyed 
preferential tariff for garment exported to 
developed countries and expatriates workers 
Ministry of Development therefore when population 
census was taken in 2011, the data for Kampong Pulau 
Baru-Baru was included in Mukim Serasa census 
(Personal Correspondence with JPKE 2019). 
were imported to work in the factories. 
When the preferential tariff ended in 2004, 
the population of Mukim Serasa declined as 
expatriates’ left and factories were closed. 
Table 1. 
Population Census of Mukim Serasa, 1971 – 
201113
Census Malay Chinese Others13 Indian Total
1971 - - - - 3,714
1981 4,086 473 610 90 5,259
1991 6,387 472 961 - 7,820
2001 6,873 468 5,974 - 13,315
2011 7,241 463 2,503 - 10,207
Source:  Adapted from Population Census 1981, 
1991, 2001; Personal Correspondence, 
JPKE 2019
The data above show in 1971 and 1981 
census, the racial breakdown for Indians was 
recognised and given a separate category 
(efforts to find the 1971 census breakdown 
for the Mukim was unsuccessful). Based on 
the 1971 census training report for census 
takers, Indians, Pakistani and Sri Lankans were 
categorised as Indians (Economic Planning 
Unit, 1971). By the 1991 population census, the 
Indian category was absorbed into ‘Others,’ 
together with ‘Other Indigenous’ who also lost 
their categorisation in the 2001 census (Pang, 
2018). In the 2011 ‘demographic characteristics’ 
published by the Department of Statistics, 7,464 
Indians were recorded in Brunei, with seven 
of them having Brunei citizenship and 63 of 
them having a Permanent Resident status in 
the country. Recent data collected from various 
newspapers and the Indian high commission 
website, shows that the Indians constitute the 
fourth largest expatriate in Brunei (Table 2) and 
they sent the third highest amount remittance 
13In 1981 Population census, there were 5 categories of 
racial background that was recorded, namely Malays, 
Other Indigenous, Chinese, Indians and Others. 
However, by 1991, the Indians were no longer recorded 
a separate section, merged under ‘Others’. In 2001 
Census, the ‘Others’ included ‘Other Indigenous’ in 
the calculation. 
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out of Brunei, valued at B$88 million in 2017 
(see Table 3). The data on Table 2 shows a 
higher number of expatriate communities than 
those officially published by the government 
agencies. In the recent legislative meeting, the 
Minister of Energy, Manpower and Industry 
(MEMI) reported that based on the Labour 
Force Survey in 2017, there were 47,490 
expatriates in the country, accounting about a 
quarter of all Brunei workforce (Kon, 2019). It 
is believed that a better data collection system 
is needed to get a better picture on the actual 
number of expatriates in Brunei. 
Of the 26 retail stores approached for 
interviews, seven agreed to be interviewed and 
their characteristics are listed on Table 4 below. 
Before the interviews were carried out a pilot 
study was conducted in a different Mukim in 
Brunei-Muara District, involving a supplier and 
a few retail stores owners.  Several important 
questions were considered taboo; for example, 
the research initially wanted to ask about  how 
the retailers find their licence owner, how 
much they pay their licence owner and if they 
have to pay extra to the owner to get workers’ 
quota. This research also wanted to ask if the 
licence owner are involved in the business 
management, but as the pilot study indicated 
that those were ‘sensitive’ and would not be 
answered by the retailers, hence the questions 
were removed. 
The author was helped by a student, 
Mr. Thittachery Ahamed, who conducted the 
interviews based on a list of questions given. 
Thittachery is a first generation Indian Muslim, 
whose relatives have opened retail stores in 
Brunei. His father used to manage a retail store 
and now works for a supplier. It is easier for 
the research if the questions were asked by 
someone who understood their language and 
has similar background as the retailers; hence 
they would not feel threatened by the questions. 
Thittachery spoke Tamil, the language spoken 
by majority of the sub-continent retailers; 
therefore it was easier for him to communicate 
with the retail store owners and managers. It 
also helped when they knew his family, as 
the Indian community is a close knit society 
in Brunei. To protect the identities of those 
who agreed to be interviewed, they will not 
be named and their anonymity are assured by 
the researcher. All interviews were carried out 
in December 2018. 
Table 2.
 Largest Migrant Worker Community in Brunei Darussalam, 2016, 2018
Countries Indonesia Malaysia The Philippines Bangladesh India
Population 80,000 30,000 23,000 20,000 11,500
Source:  Adapted from Anya (2018); Gita (2016); The Malay Mail (2018); High Commission of India 
(2018); Bhuyan (2018).
Table 3.
The Amount of Remittance Value by Destination (in Brunei Dollars), 2012-2017
Countries 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Indonesia 238.9 253.7 243.7 246.5 239.1 235.4
The Philippines 146.7 164.4 167.2 177.6 161.1 149.5
India 60.7 79.2 81.2 88.7 94.0 88.0
Malaysia 75.3 133.3 113.3 74.3 68.2 71.4
Bangladesh 43.4 50.4 56.0 62.7 67.6 69.3
Thailand 39.5 34.9 28.7 25.7 23.6 19.0
Source: Department of Statistics, JPKE, 2018 (Personal Communication)
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Results and Discussion
In Brunei For Many Years
From the profile of the interviewed 
retailers shown in Table 4, almost all except one 
of the retailers (OM6) has been in Brunei for 
over 10 years. They have been in the business 
for quite some time, first brought in by their 
family and relatives into Brunei. For example, 
OM2, he was brought to Brunei by his father 
who owns a retail business in Brunei and he 
is now managing the business as they have 
several branches of the shop in the country. 
As it is difficult to get Bruneian citizenship or 
Permanent Residency status, the retailers are 
aware that they have to leave the country once 
their employment quota expires; therefore if 
they are keen for their family members to take 
over the business, they have to bring their 
children and relatives into Brunei to continue 
with the business until their quota could not 
be renewed or extended. 
The Brunei Labour law at this moment is 
quite flexible allowing those with ‘supervisor’ 
quota to bring in their family into the 
country if they have a salary above B$1,500. 
The government has to be flexible with its 
employment quota as there are certain jobs that 
the locals might not be interested in, especially 
those with low salary offerings, therefore 
there is a need to sure there are flexibility 
for expatriate to fill in those jobs. It requires 
further research on how many employment 
quotas are allowed by the Labour Department 
when a retail shop opens as the government 
has already reduced the number of quota 
available to encourage Bruneians to take over 
the jobs due to increasing unemployment in 
the country. Recently, the Centre of Capacity 
Building has trained over 240 Bruneians to work 
in retail stores and the government paying an 
extra B$100 monthly to their salary (Azney, 
2018). It is hope that by exposing and instilling 
some entrepreneurial spirit in local Bruneians, 
they can learn and aim to own a retail store in 
the future. If left to the market forces, salary 
in retail stores are low and since Brunei does 
not have minimum wage, the government has 
to step in to subsidise the salary to encourage 
locals to be involve in the sector. 
One Business Owner, Different Business 
Licences
Either to capture more market in a small 
area or to get more quotas for their relatives 
or friends to come to the country, there are 
shops which are owned by the same business 
owner but using different business licence. 
For example, OM2’s family owned three other 
retail businesses under different business 
names in the Mukim. While there were no 
direct questions on the worker’s quota were 
asked, it seemed that the reason to have 
different company licenses names meant a 
higher chance of obtaining more quotas to 
bring in their friends or relatives from India. 
Hiring their friends and family members is 
Table 4. 
Profile of Interviewed Retail Owners and Managers
Owner/
Manager






1 35 Owner 14 years Indian Muslim Yes
2 23 Owner’s son 18 years Indian Muslim Yes
3 35 Owner 10 years Indian Muslim Yes
4 45 Owner 18 years Indian Muslim Yes 
5 30 Manager 16 years Indian Muslim Yes
6 25 Manager 1 year Indian Muslim Yes
7 51 Owner 31 years Indian Muslim Yes
Source: Research Results by Author’s 
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often cheaper than employing local Bruneians 
who are not used to long hours, low pay and 
they leave the job easily. Furthermore, Brunei 
is a safe and peaceful country where living 
standard is low as basic necessities, such as 
rice, water and electricity, are subsidised by 
the government. Another reason for using 
different names could be because different 
license owners approached them and hence 
they can use different business license. With 
different business license, expatriate business 
owner can have more branches in different 
geographical areas of the country. 
When two shops were  approached for 
the research, the helpers told the interviewer, 
that their employer owned another shop across 
town with a different name from their own 
shop. When approached, the ‘owner’ declined 
to be interviewed. The problem of knowing 
the real owner of the shop is not easy despite 
having the business licence certificate displayed 
on the shop’s wall. From observation, some 
shops do not clearly  display their licence 
although it is a requirement, while some 
would hang the business registration  so high 
that it was not easy to read the details of the 
license owner. A meeting with an officer at the 
Companies and Business Names Division at the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy also agreed 
that it is ‘normal’ for expatriates to use local 
citizen’s licenses to do business as seen from the 
business license certificates issued, however, 
since the government’s policy is still flexible 
and allow license renting to occur, no firm 
action has been taken against license owner 
unless crimes have been committed. 
One Business Licence, Different Owners
One of the retail shops which has similar 
name is found not only in Mukim Serasa, 
however, it was also found in Mukim Beribi. 
Since the retail shop in Mukim Serasa did 
not want to participate in the interview, and 
claimed that their boss also owns another shop 
along Jalan Serasa, the researcher happened to 
see the company’s name in Mukim Beribi and 
decided to ask the owner there. It was revealed 
that although the name of the company is 
similar, implying that the two stores should be 
owned by the same owner, but in fact, there are 
two different owners using the same company 
name. From this example, it shows that licence 
owners do rent their licence to different people, 
earning more ‘rents’ from the other business 
owner. As long as there are no legal disputes 
or questions from the authorities, then the 
businesses can carry on without much problem. 
There are also two shops with the same 
name which is opened opposite of each other 
in Mukim Serasa. Both retailers declined to be 
interviewed. It is surprising to the residents in 
the Mukim on why both shops with similar 
names are operating across each other and 
while it may seemed that the one claimed to be 
a  ‘wholesaler’ in their signboard and the other 
is not but in terms of the goods in the shop, they 
still sell similar goods. 
In comparison to bigger retail stores, often 
owned by the ethnic Chinese, such as Hua Ho, 
Soon Lee, First Emporium Group, and Sim Kim 
Huat, they may have several branches across 
the country, however they are still owned by 
the same family members and do not sell their 
licences for others to use it. They also do not 
need to bring their families or friends in large 
numbers from Taiwan, Singapore or Malaysia 
to help them managed the store. Instead, they 
can employ expatriates or locals in the country 
as allowed by the Labour Department. 
Diversifying From or To Retail Store?
OM7 has been in Brunei for over 30 years, 
and he originally started with a barber shop 
and a restaurant. It is only recently that he 
ventured into the retail sector, opening a large 
retail shop along Jalan Muara in Mukim Serasa. 
Based on this, it shows that the owners do not 
only focus on retail business but also other 
businesses as competition among retail stores 
may have reduced their profit, therefore it only 
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make good business sense if their business is 
diversified.
It is not clear from the other business 
names that one owner might own different 
business unless further scrutiny on the business 
licence is made or if the business owner actually 
admits to it. As OM7 shops are obvious as 
he used the same name for his retail store, 
restaurant and barber shop. While OM7 was 
open to share the information, others are not 
keen to share the businesses that they own. It 
is also possible based on the OM7 interview 
that the Indians in Brunei started with small 
tailoring, barber or restaurant businesses before 
venturing into retail shops (and in recent times 
hardware and construction companies). These 
findings are supported by Mani (2008:178) who 
wrote that Tamil Muslims has a ‘historical role 
in operating restaurants’ in Brunei, while Malai 
Yusop (2018) is keen to reveal that the Indians 
have taken over from the Chinese in the textiles, 
barber, retail and tailor shops businesses. More 
interviews and research with more retailers can 
only verify this assumption. 
Business Survival: Shoppers to Miri is Not 
A Problem
Majority of business owners believe 
that despite Bruneians going to Miri for their 
groceries, it does not affect them significantly. 
OM1 and OM6 believed that their customers 
can only go at certain times of the days and not 
every day to Miri. They have loyal customers 
who come to their shops to buy their goods; 
hence they are still able to survive in this 
small yet competitive market.  The retailers 
are providing goods that are near to villagers, 
rather the villagers having to go to commercial 
areas which maybe over 5km or 20km away 
from their residence, therefore the business 
owners can still survive from competition from 
bigger retailers or businesses in Miri. 
The statement made by the retailers in the 
interviews on businesses not being affected by 
the competition from Miri seemed to contradict 
the evidence from the Economic Census of 
Enterprise of 2015 which clearly shows a 
decline of retail and wholesale businesses in 
the country. From 2010 to 2015, there is a drop 
in the number of retailers and wholesalers in 
the country, from 1,907 to 1,815 enterprises 
in 2015 (JPKE, 2016). Furthermore, one of the 
reasons why the Brunei government suddenly 
change its decades old policy on paying public 
servants salary every month to every two weeks 
(bi-monthly; fortnightly) as of June 2018 was 
due more Bruneians buying their groceries 
across the border affecting the domestic market 
industry (Hj Abu Bakar, 2018; Othman, 2018b).
The statement by OM1 and OM6 
therefore, has to be treated with caution, 
although they are ‘survivors’ in the market 
because their shops still exists hence they were 
interviewed for this research, perhaps their 
business strategy is different (and undisclosed) 
in this competitive and saturated market. 
New Players in the Retail Market:  Price Wars, 
Low Profit and Informal Money Lenders and 
Changers
There are new players in the market. 
Initially dominated by the Indians, however 
there are three shops in Muara Town which 
is owned and run by the Bangladeshi. Being 
recent migrants and most of them are employed 
in the construction sector; the Bangladeshi has 
overtaken the Indians as the fourth largest 
expatriates in Brunei (see Table 2). According 
to retail owners (OM1 and OM7), they are not 
concerned with the new entrant to the market as 
they served different segment of the population 
or customers. While the Indian run retail 
shops claimed that they serve everyone and 
are bigger in comparison to the Bangladeshi 
shops, the Bangladeshi shops are smaller and 
served specialised Bangladeshi food, hence are 
patronized by Bangladeshi workers.
OM2 and OM5 claimed that  the 
Bangladeshi retailers started a price war, selling 
below cost price. OM2 claimed,
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“…they are selling below the cost 
price because the owner is more 
interested to generate money to loan 
the Bangladeshi who patron the 
shops. Since the goods are sent on 
consignment basis, the retailers can 
afford to sell cheap and with the cash 
from their customers, they can use 
the cash to loan the money to those 
who need it.” 
OM2 further explained that the interest 
from the loan obtained makes up for the low 
prices of goods that they sell to the customers; 
and they could still survive with this type 
of business operation.  OM2 also reveal that 
many Indians run retail shops which also serve 
as unlicensed money changers to the Indian 
residents in the country. According to OM2,
“… Everyone knows it, its common. 
They act as the middle men in the 
transaction, whereby the retailers 
collect the money from the Indians 
working in Brunei, and the money is 
transferred to their bank account in 
India. This saves the Indians transfer 
fee where the local banks or remittance 
companies would otherwise charge 
quite high. The retailers normally 
charge B$5 per transaction.” 
As remittance to India constitute the 
third largest amount of money remitted out 
of Brunei (See Table 3), it is estimated that an 
average Indian national sent B$7,625 back to 
their home country in 2017. However, if is 
true that the Indian retail shops also act as 
remittance agency, then the actual amount 
remitted out would be more than the one 
officially captured by the regulator, Brunei 
Darussalam’s Monetary Authority (AMBD). 
Since there is no income tax in Brunei, Brunei 
is a good place to do business. However, it is 
against the law and regulation for unregistered 
businesses to act as remittance agencies and if 
reported, such activities will be shut down by 
the authorities. 
While OM1 and OM7 are not concerned 
with the new entrant to the market, OM3 is. 
Furthermore, OM3 also claim that business 
is not as good as before as government policy 
of fortnightly salary14 affected his business. 
Another reason, observed from the location 
of the shop not mentioned by OM3, is that 
his shop is next to a main road, and the road 
condition is not in good therefore it is not 
surprising that his shop is not popular with 
potential customers. 
OM4 however do not believe that the 
new entrant to the market is a threat as the 
country is an,
 “…‘open market’ and people can 
just set up business. There is no 
problem. They can enter the market.”
As most of the items are imported items, 
the profit is low; therefore, retail shops do 
not actually earn much. Middlemen, as in big 
companies, the wholesalers or suppliers are 
actually earning a lot compared to the small 
retail stores according to OM4. If there is a 
small profit margin to be earned from the retail 
stores (they have to pay shop rental, employees, 
water and electricity among others), then how 
could the retail stores survive? Therefore, it is 
possible that the retail stores had to do other 
business as highlighted above, other than retail 
to survive in the current economic situation. 
More in-depth research is needed before 
further generalisation could be made from 
such statement. 
Implications and Further Research
The research shows that the small retail 
shops in Brunei are dominated by ethnic 
Indians who have been in the business for the 
last 30 years. Their families and relatives have 
14 In June 2018, all public servants receive their salary 
every fortnightly rather than monthly as practiced for 
decades. The reasons for the fortnightly salary was to 
improve public servants’ cash flow and daily expanses; 
help sustain commercial and economic activities in the 
country and make the domestic economy more resilient.
121
Li Li Pang, No Longer ‘Ali Baba’ But  ‘Ali Chandran’ Businesses in Brunei Darussalam: An Exploration
been here in Brunei decades ago, therefore they 
continued to do business in Brunei as current 
policy still allows them to do so. Instead of 
‘Ali Baba’ businesses in Brunei, the term ‘Ali 
Chandran’ businesses is probably appropriate 
term to use when referring businesses which 
are owned by people from the Asian sub-
continent. Although the government is aware 
and is concerned with the proliferation of such 
businesses in the villages, the government 
has not taken serious actions to stop citizens 
renting their business licenses to expatriates. 
The reasons for this are clear, the businesses 
are providing useful service to the villages; 
license owners earns income from the license 
rent and such business activities have been 
operating peacefully for decades. As there 
has been no significant negative impact or 
problem that are associated with ‘Ali Chandran’ 
business activities, although the Home Minister 
recently highlighted the Ministry will start an 
‘awareness programme’ on the consequences 
of license renting activity (Othman, 2019).it is 
believed that while the business arrangement 
will continue, however, businesses will be 
forced to take more locals as their employees as 
expatriate quota will be cut by the government 
to help unemployed Bruneians. If illegal 
remittance is a problem, the official value is 
still smaller compared to Bruneians who shop 
across the border. 
If there is evidence of illegal activity being 
carried out, such as informal money changers 
or remittance services provided, then it is 
within the government’s power and authority 
to stop the businesses from operating and 
repatriate those who are involved. Insinuation 
of illegal activities of the community has so far 
has been unproven although one recent case 
highlights the possibility. In March 2018, the 
Brunei Indian Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 
was ordered by the Brunei High Court to pay 
B$950,000 in damages to the Chairman of one 
of the textile companies in the country, who 
was defamed by the members of the ICC for 
his alleged money laundering and extortion 
activities (Bandial, 2018b). 
Due to higher unemployment rate in 
the country, the government has encouraged 
the locals to participate in the retail sector by 
cutting expatriates’ quota and subsidizing their 
wages with the hope that they would be able 
to manage and own a retail store in the future. 
By working in the sector, it is the first step for 
Bruneians to see how the retail store operates 
and how they can learn from it as highlighted 
by Malai Yusof (2018) who noted that the 
Indians initially worked for the Chinese and 
once they understood the business, they then 
venture out and set up their own retail shops, 
hence ‘overtaking’ the Chinese in the business. 
If the policy is successful, it would be one of the 
important policy successes of the government 
to encourage entrepreneurship among local 
citizens. 
There were several limitations of the 
research. One limitation of this research was 
that it only focused on a small Mukim in 
Brunei, therefore it cannot be generalised to 
the whole of Brunei. The number of interviews 
conducted was small therefore future research 
can expand to other Mukims or commercial 
areas where the presence of ‘Ali Chandran’ 
businesses ‘dominance’ is clear and obvious. 
Further interviews with government agencies 
and licenced owners need to be carried out 
to get clearer picture of the ‘Ali Chandran’ 
businesses in Brunei and why the policy is 
allowed to continue and why it should not 
continue. The research initially wanted to ask 
about the ‘rents’ that the business owners have 
to give to their license owners, however since 
it was considered taboo; it was dropped from 
the questions. Nevertheless, future research 
can focus on how the business owner finds the 
license owner, what guarantees are given in the 
business arrangement and how the profits are 
shared if any.
The emergence of new migrants into 
the retail market provides further research 
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to be made, as to how and why did they 
decided to enter the retail market. If there are 
new entrants to the market, does it mean that 
there are others who have exited the market? 
If there is, what is stopping the locals from 
entering the market since new migrant are 
able to set up the business? More research is 
needed to understand the hurdles faced by 
local Bruneians in setting up a retail business. 
While proliferation of small retail 
business in Brunei run by the ‘Ali Chandran’ 
business owners can be unsightly along the 
main road, perhaps the government should 
stop allowing these businesses to be open 
along the main road in the first place. This 
would mean a new policy on urban planning 
whereby the government can stop residential 
houses from being converted into shops along 
the main road. In national public housing 
areas, for example, commercial area should be 
developed within, encouraging businesses to 
congregate in the area, benefiting the residents. 
The government can own the commercial area 
through its GLCs like in Singapore where every 
new township has a dedicated shopping mall 
for residents to shop within the area and do not 
need to go elsewhere for their basic necessities. 
At this moment, the Brunei government does 
not have such policy and even if the land has 
been allocated, no commercial areas are built 
within, therefore residents has no choice but 
to go the next nearest roadside shop to buy 
their daily necessities. The government can 
also encouraged public private partnership 
(PPP) to develop the commercial area in the 
public housing areas, reducing the need for 
the government to be involved in business and 
roadside houses being converted to retail stores 
which can pose traffic hazard and congestion 
at the local area. 
Conclusion 
This paper fills in the scarce literature 
on ‘Ali Baba’ and ‘Ali Chandran’ businesses 
in Brunei. The activities of license renting are 
widely known in the region but are under 
researched in Brunei. Although the term 
‘Ali Baba’ is still widely used, to connote the 
renting of business license to expatriates, 
however, it is now more obvious that the 
term ‘Ali Chandran’ is the correct term when 
referring business owners who comes from 
the Asian sub-continent, partnering with local 
license owners in Brunei. The research found 
that the small ‘Ali Chandran’ businesses are 
dominating the small retail market in Brunei; 
they have diversified into other forms of 
business and they are said to be  unofficial 
and unregistered remittance agency  to their 
countrymen. Although a new entrant to 
the retail market has been detected due to 
new wave of migrants into the country, ‘Ali 
Chandrans’ are not concerned as they are more 
established and they cater different segments of 
the society. Local licence owners have benefited 
from the ‘Ali Chandran’ business arrangement 
and since there is no serious offense that has 
been committed except ‘misuse’ of licence by 
the local owner, license renting activities will 
continue in Brunei. The government always 
has the option to revoke the licenses of citizens 
who rented it as it can be obvious who runs 
and owns the business; however it is clear that 
the relationship between licence owner and 
renter has existed for decades and the services 
provided by the businesses benefits the society 
in general, therefore to end such arrangement 
can be unpopular among retired locals who 
depended on the income from such rent.
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